Minnesota\u27s Grain Elevator Legislation: Inadequate Protection for Minnesota\u27s Grain Farmers Means Overprotection for the Country Elevator by Gillingham, Todd
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 13 | Issue 1 Article 5
1987
Minnesota's Grain Elevator Legislation: Inadequate
Protection for Minnesota's Grain Farmers Means
Overprotection for the Country Elevator
Todd Gillingham
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Gillingham, Todd (1987) "Minnesota's Grain Elevator Legislation: Inadequate Protection for Minnesota's Grain Farmers Means
Overprotection for the Country Elevator," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 13: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss1/5
MINNESOTA'S GRAIN ELEVATOR LEGISLATION:
INADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR MINNESOTA'S
GRAIN FARMERS MEANS
OVERPROTECTION FOR THE
COUNTRY ELEVATOR
The plight offarmers in today's economy has been well documented. In addi-
tion to the traditional difficulties, many farmers have recently been confronted
with the prospect of grain elevator bankruptcies. Minnesota's present legisla-
tion has not sufficiently protected farmers from the difficulties this possibility
presents. This Note describes the problems faced by farmers in this area and
recommends legislative alternatives to provide relief.
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INTRODUCTION
The number of grain elevator failures has increased dramatically
in Minnesota and the rest of the nation in the past fifteen years.'
Nationally, there have been over 165 elevator bankruptcies and Min-
nesota currently claims twelve of these.2 The magnitude of the prob-
1. See Carr, Jackson, Logsdon & Miller, Grain Elevator Bankruptcies in the U.S.:
1974 Through 1979, at 1 (prepared for Illinois Legislative Council, Memorandum File
9-179, March 1981); see also Casey, Conley & Ahlen, Grain Elevator Insolvencies and
Bankruptcies in Eight North Central States 1974-82, at 1 (prepared for the Illinois Legisla-
tive Council, Memorandum File 9-391, March 1984). To date, the later study is the
most comprehensive data on past insolvency losses. The study is based on 90 of 165
insolvencies reported.
2. See Casey, Conley & Ahlen, supra note 1, at 7. This report lists the number of
grain elevator bankruptcies nationally since 1975. See also Carr, Jackson, Logsdon &
Miller, supra note 1, at 5; MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE: REPORT RE-
GARDING THE NUMBER OF STATE GRAIN ELEVATOR BANKRUPTCIES (July 1, 1984)[herein-
after MINNESOTA GRAIN ELEVATOR FAILURES]. The Minnesota failures include:
Hastings Farmer's Cooperative Association, Hastings, Minn.; Herbeck's Farm Ser-
vice, Green Valley, Minn.; Clara City Feed and Grain, Inc., Clara City, Minn.; Wel-
come Grain Co., Welcome, Minn.;Jerry Kern, d/b/a Kern Grain Co., Kenyon, Minn.;
1
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lem is even more staggering if one considers the dollars involved
when a country elevator files bankruptcy. The losses suffered by
grain farmers stemming from elevator insolvencies have become
enormous.3 The eight year span from 1974 to 1982 saw 5,184 grain
producers across the country file bankruptcy claims totaling over
fifty-eight million dollars.4 Recovery on these claims has been a
meager forty percent.5 In Minnesota, grain farmers have filed claims
against insolvent elevators in excess of two million dollars in the past
ten years. Recovery on these claims is at thirty-three percent; some-
what higher than the national average, but still insufficient to protect
Victoria Grain Co., Victoria, Minn.; Lundberg, d/b/a Lundberg Feed and Grain,
Houston, Minn.; Jensen Elevator, Inc., Lanesboro, Minn.; Freidrichs, d/b/a/
Freidrichs Grain, Gibbon, Minn.; Miller Feed Elevator, Balaton, Minn.; Lakeland
Bean, Inc., Lakeland, Minn.; Judson Market, Inc., Judson, Minn.
A country elevator is synonymous with a public grain warehouse. Interview with
Robert Swanson, Director of Public Relations for the Minnesota Department of Agri-
culture, St. Paul, Minn. (November 1, 1985) [hereinafter Swanson Interview]. A
grain warehouse is defined as any "elevator, flour, cereal or feed mill, malthouse or
warehouse in which grain belonging to a person other than the grain warehouse op-
erator is received for purchase or storage." MINN. STAT. § 232.21, subd. 8 (1984).
For a recent illustration of the tremendous problems that can develop because of
a grain elevator bankruptcy see James v. Cryts (In re Cox Cotton Co.), 24 Bankr. 930
(E.D. Ark. 1982). Wayne Cryts stored grain in a Ristine, Missouri elevator operated
by the James Brothers (debtors). The bankruptcy petition was filed in the Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas on August 11, 1980. The trustee
appointed by the court requested authority to sell all the debtor's grain free and clear
of all liens and interests. The trustee's request infuriated Cryts and other claimant-
creditors. These enraged farmers barricaded entrances to the elevator, which re-
sulted in Federal Marshals arriving on the scene. Id. at 932.
Cryts and several other creditors removed over 31,000 bushels of soybeans from
the elevator in mid-February of 1981. The grain was removed in the presence of the
marshal and several FBI agents. A convoy of 77 trucks transported the confiscated
grain to a neighboring elevator in Bernie, Missouri. Id.
The trustee received permission to sell the grain, but found that Cryts and his
accomplices had removed the soybeans from the Bernie location in the wee morning
hours of July 22, 1981, and held the grain hostage at an undisclosed location. Id.
Civil contempt charges were filed by the trustee. At the subsequent hearing,
Cryts invoked his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to
answer any questions regarding the kidnapping of the grain. Judge Baker of the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas jailed Cryts for
contempt. Id. at 933.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas reversed
the contempt finding of the bankruptcy court, declaring that the power of civil con-
tempt vested in a bankruptcy judgment under the 1978 Bankrutcy Code was an un-
constitutional grant ofjudicial power. Id. at 956. The district court then directed the
appellant farmers to appear before that court to testify why they should not be held
in civil and criminal contempt for the removal of the grain. Id. at 959.
3. Carr, Jackson, Logsdon & Miller, supra note 1, at 5-6; Casey, Conley & Ahlen,
supra note 1, at 10.
4. Carr, Jackson, Logsdon & Miller, supra note 1, at 5-6.
5. Id.
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the grain farmer.6
Worries of the grain farmer have traditionally included the
weather, insects, uncontrollable markets, inadequate government
policies, and international politics. 7 Today, the farmer's dire finan-
cial situation and the accompanying doom of foreclosure by the
Farmer's Home Administration and Production Credit Association
are worries added to this already lengthy list.8 Grain elevator bank-
ruptcies have also been added to this list, and can be remedied na-
tionally and locally with adequate legislative modification.
Minnesota's first legislation regulating the relationship between
grain elevators and grain farmers was enacted near the turn of the
century.9 Recent changes in these statutes have failed to keep pace
with the modernization of agriculture and its accompanying financial
problems. The problem with these statutes is illustrated by the in-
creasing number of Minnesota grain farmers who have lost substan-
tial amounts of money in grain elevator bankruptcies. Among
problems not adequately reached by the current legislation are: (1)
undercapitalization; (2) poor recordkeeping and accounting prac-
tices; (3) speculation with the depositor's funds in the futures mar-
ket; and (4) fraud. t 0
One notable example of the inadequacy of the state legislation oc-
curred in the late 1970's near Kenyon, Minnesota. The case of In re
Kern Grain Co. I I involved a country elevator, licensed by the state,
which allegedly reaped funds from forty-one grain farmers. These
unsuspecting depositors claimed they were merely storing their
grain with the Kern elevator.12 The elevator, however, disregarded
the farmer's intentions and sold their grain to other elevators. The
elevator continued charging the farmers storage fees for grain which
it no longer held.13 The elevator eventually became insolvent leav-
6. MINNESOTA GRAIN ELEVATOR FAILURES, supra note 2, at 1-4. The report found
total losses due to elevator insolvency to be approximately $1.9 million in this state
since 1975. This figure does not consider the several pending cases that have yet to
be decided.
7. See generally Keith, Revolutionary Change Being Considered in Government Warehouse
Programs, GOVERNMENT & GRAIN, Oct. 15, 1981, at 2-3.
8. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune, Nov. 1, 1985, § D, at 1, col. 1.
9. See Act of April 7, 1893, ch. 28, 1893 Minn. Laws 131 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. §§ 232.20-.25 (1984)); see also Act of April 14, 1899, ch. 225, 1899 Minn.
Laws 245 (requiring those selling farm produce on commission to give a bond to the
state for benefit of their consignors).
10. See Casey, Conley & Ahlen, supra note 1, at 6-8; Swanson Interview, supra note
2. Mr. Swanson confirmed the sorry state of the Minnesota grain farmer and the
inadequacy of the current grain legislation,
11. 369 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
12. In re Kern, AGR-83-004-RL (Administrative Hearing, Sept. 24, 1984)[herein-
after Findings of Fact].
13. Id. The administrative findings stated the background facts as follows:
1987]
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ing the farmers with an aggregate loss of over $600,000 on an invest-
1. Kern Grain Company, which started accepting grain (corn, soybeans
and wheat) from farmers for storage in 1975, grew out of the corn farming
operation ofJerry and Phyliss Kern. The Company's facilities are located in
Rice County, approximately eight miles west and south of Kenyon,
Minnesota.
2. Jerry and Phyliss Kern, husband and wife, owned Kern Grain Company
as a sole proprietorship. At all times relevant herein, Jerry Kern concen-
trated on the corn farming operation and Phyliss Kern ran the Kern Grain
Company business.
3. During the late 1970's, the business grew significantly. Additional stor-
age facilities were added, including a grain dryer, a scale and auxiliary build-
ings. The business was coordinated out of a converted house trailer on the
same site as the Kern's home farm .... By 1981, the Company had 186,000
bushels of storage space on the Rice County site.
4. For each year running from July I to June 30 between July 1, 1979 and
June 30, 1982, Kern Grain, as Principal, entered into a Public Local Grain
Warehouseman's Bond with the Auto-Owner's Insurance Company
(Surety), as required by MINN. STAT. ch. 232....
5. In most cases involving storage of grain, farmers would negotiate an
oral contract with Kern Grain, in person or over the telephone, to the effect
that grain received by Kern was to be stored. In almost every such case, the
farmer was also advised at that time as to the Company's monthly storage
charges.
6. From 1979 through early 1982, Kern Grain did a large volume of busi-
ness. The Company advertised extensively in local print and electronic me-
dia, claiming a large amount of storage space. This advertising campaign
came at a time when farm prices generally were down and farmers in south
and southeast Minnesota were producing bumper crops, causing a great de-
mand for storage space on the part of persons who did not wish to market
their crops until prices went up again.
During this period, the Company sent out a monthly newsletter re-
minding farmers of the availability of storage space and favorable storage
terms. Frequent ads to this effect appeared in Kenyon, Faribault and
Owatonna newspapers, one of which ads claimed that Kern had "leased
800,000 bushel of storage space at a facility in the Twin Cities." On at least
one occasion, Phyliss Kern told a claimant that the Company had "a mil-
lion" bushels of storage.
7. In fact, Kern Grain never did buy or lease any storage space beyond that
on the Rice County site. Its advertising, newsletters and oral representa-
tions showing otherwise were falsehoods.
8. Most of the grain (corn and soybeans) involved in this matter never
went through the Kern facility at Kenyon. Kern's trucks would pick up the
grain at the Claimants' farms and transport it directly to grain storage facili-
ties of large grain processors such as Archer-Daniels-Midland (ADM) or
Continental Grain in St. Paul, South St. Paul or Red Wing. Most of the
grain delivered to Kern's facility in Rice County was handled the same way,
and left Kenyon for the grain terminals with [sic] a few days. While repre-
senting to the Claimants that the grain was being stored for them, Kern
represented to the large grain companies that it (Kern) owned the grain,
and that it was delivering it to them pursuant to earlier contractual arrange-
ments between Kern and the large grain processors. Kern would be paid for
the grain upon delivery, but never told the farmers that this grain had been
sold and did not forward any of the proceeds to the farmers. In addition,
Kern continued to assess storage charges against the Claimants' accounts.
This was the general pattern followed by Kern in marketing grain during the
fall of 1981. This scheme gave Kern Grain a large amount of cash in late
1981 and, since grain prices were still low, the farmer-Claimants were not
then making demand for that cash.
[Vol. 13
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10. In the fall of 1981, United States Department of Agriculture officials,
who inspected Kern Grain's facility and records, informed the Company that
it was in violation of applicable rules and regulations because Company
books showed grain held as "Price Later" without signed contracts from
farmers documenting the "Price Later" arrangements. This information
was given to the Company after many of the Claimants had delivered their
grain to Kern and Kern had, without the Claimants' knowledge, actually sold
the grain. In carrying this grain as "Price Later" on its books, Kern was
representing to the Inspectors that the farmers had already transferred title
in (sold) the grain in question to Kern, with the price to be set and payment
made at a later time. This representation was false.
11. The Federal inspectors informed Kern that, unless "Price Later" or
"Delayed Pricing" Contracts were signed by the farmers to cover the grain
represented on the Company's books, the grain would be considered as be-
ing in "open storage."
12. After the Federal inspection summarized in the two preceeding find-
ings, Kern Grain purchased Delayed Pricing Contract forms from the Kem-
ske Paper Company and bookkeper-accountant [sic] John Timmers mailed
out the forms to each Claimant with the written request "Please sign and
return." There was no explanation of the meaning or implication of the
Contracts, which itemized and totaled the loads the farmers believed they
had placed with the Company for storage. Many of the Claimants signed
these Contracts, thinking that they were simply confirmation of storage. In
fact, the Contracts purported to transfer title of grain to the Company from
the farmers. Most of them were back-dated, and they quoted the agreed-to
storage fees as "service charges."
13. The Claimants were not informed that, at the time the Delayed Pricing
Contracts were mailed out, their grain had already been converted by Kern
Grain Company which had sold it to the large grain companies at which it
was purportedly "stored" in space "leased" by Kern. The contract forms
contained a warranty by the seller (farmer-Claimant) that (s)he still owned
the grain.
14. In the spring of 1982, farm commodity prices began to rise and the
Claimants called Kern Grain, or went in to the Rice County facility to direct
the Company to sell their stored grain and give them the proceeds ...
[T]he Claimants in this proceeding were only partially paid or not at all be-
cause Kern Grain had squandered the cash received in the fall of 1981 to the
point where it was unable to meet its obligations.
15. In April of 1982, Kern Grain's credit line at the various banks with
which it dealt was cut off. During that month, Jerry Kern auctioned off his
farm equipment in an effort to keep the Company afloat. And, on April 19
and 20, 1982, the Kerns met with several of the wealthier and more influen-
tial (as perceived by the Kerns) of their farm customers in an effort to form
an investor's syndicate to re-finance the Company's operations. These ef-
forts at re-capitalization ultimately failed, as did a proposed sale of the Com-
pany ....
16. Kern Grain did not cease operations until early July of 1982. Its trucks
were still operating in the vicinity, picking up grain, and the Company con-
tinued to pay farmers and employees to the extent it was able. In May and
June of 1982, the Company issued three newsletters, each of which told its
customers that, although the Company was in financial trouble, it was taking
measures to work its way out of those troubles. (citations omitted).
17. Kern Grain Company ceased operations in early July, 1982, and on
July 14, 1982, the Company filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 (Dissolu-
tion) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code.
18. The first claim in this proceeding was made... on April 29, 1982. The
final claims .. .were filed on November 29, 1982.
Id. at 2-5.
1987]
5
Gillingham: Minnesota's Grain Elevator Legislation: Inadequate Protection for
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
ment which should have been devoid of almost all risk.14
This Note will analyze how farmers sustain such heavy losses de-
spite legislation which purports to regulate and protect the farmer's
interest. This Note will also explain the social and economic effects
of a grain elevator bankruptcy, and illustrate typical grain marketing
options and problems accompanying these options. The inadequacy
of the Minnesota legislation will be demonstrated through Kern.
Analysis of this legislation will reveal why it actually protects the
bankrupt elevator rather than the farmer. Finally, suggested statu-
tory reforms will conclude this Note, offering better protection for
the rights of grain producers should their local elevator become
insolvent.
I. THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF GRAIN
ELEVATOR BANKRUPTCIES
The problem surrounding grain elevator failures is felt throughout
the entire rural community. Grain farmers who cannot recoup their
losses in a bankruptcy proceeding may have no option but to liqui-
date or refinance farmstead assets.' 5 Even if the grain farmer does
recover all of his loss in the bankruptcy proceedings, the lengthy de-
lays inherent in the bankruptcy process interfere with farm opera-
tions. Financial burdens are imposed because the funds tied up in
bankruptcy are usually the only source of financing for next year's
planting. The entire farm's existence may, therefore, be jeopardized
by the delay created by the bankruptcy process.' 6
In addition, the farmer incurs increased marketing costs when the
local elevator fails. After a country elevator becomes insolvent, grain
farmers usually transfer their business to large commercial elevators
which are thought to be in a stronger financial position than the
smaller country elevator.'7 Increased transportation costs result be-
cause the large commercial elevators are normally farther from the
grain farmer's fields. This increase in the cost of grain merchandis-
ing results in less net income for the grain farmer.' 8 In addition to
the increased expenses, the grain farmer's dealing with the larger
elevators will eventually force the smaller elevators from competi-
tion.19 The dwindling number of country elevators will also de-
crease the competition for grain and, thus, will further decrease
14. Id.
15. Note, Dealing with Grain Dealers: The Use of State Legislation to Avert Grain Elevator
Failures, 68 IOWA L. REV. 305, 308 (1983).
16. Id. at 308.
17. Id. at 309.
18. See id.
19. Id. See also Swanson Interview, supra note 2.
[Vol. 13
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grain prices. 20
In addition to the grain farmers, there are many others that experi-
ence the adverse impact of a grain elevator failure.21 Banks and
other businesses that deal with the elevator also realize losses. A
country elevator is usually one of the larger employers in a rural
community. Many residents may, therefore, find themselves unem-
ployed when an elevator fails.22 Businesses also feel the impact be-
cause the money generated by the elevator is suddenly withdrawn
from the community. 23 These detrimental social and economic im-
pacts felt by grain farmers, elevator employees, local businesses, and
the surrounding community demonstrate a problem requiring imme-
diate attention.2
4
II. GRAIN MARKETING OPTIONS AND ACCOMPANYING PROBLEMS
When harvest time arrives, grain farmers have four basic op-
tions.25 The farmer can either: (1) feed the grain to the livestock;
(2) store the grain on the farm; (3) sell the crop for cash in a grain-
glutted market; or (4) transfer the grain to an elevator.26 Among
these basic decisions lie variations that are becoming commonplace
in transactions between the grain farmer and the country elevator.
The first option, feeding the crop to the livestock, involves no risk
since there is no sale involved. Not all farmers, however, are able to
use this option. Some grain, notably soybeans, is not generally used
as feed. In addition, not all farmers have adequate numbers of live-
stock to consume all the grain the farmer may raise.
Some grain farmers minimize their risk in marketing grain by in-
vesting in their own on-farm storage facilities. In addition to the cost
of constructing such facilities, there are problems associated with
maintaining the quality of the grain. 27 These problems make the use
of grain elevators an attractive alternative that has been a beneficial
service to both parties. Recent economic conditions, however, have
brought difficulty to both parties of this transaction. Improved legis-
lation is necessary to retain the partnership of the grain farmer and
the elevator operator.
The cash sale is arguably the least risky option for the grain
20. Note, supra note 15, at 309.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Hamilton & Looney, Federal and State Regulation of Grain Warehouses and Grain
Warehouse Bankruptcy, 27 S.D.L. REV. 334, 336-75 (1982).
26. Id.
27. Id.
19871
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farmer.28 Payment is received upon delivery of the crop to the eleva-
tor. Two inherent problems make this safe option unfeasible in most
instances. First, market prices are usually at their lowest at harvest
time, making this transaction unlikely to realize any profit. 29 The
second disadvantage of the cash sale is the potential for an elevator's
check to be worthless due to insufficient funds.30 Assuming that the
farmer does not use the grain for feed, sell it for cash, or store it on
the farm, the farmer must deal with a grain elevator. A variety of
risky transactions are possible once the farmer decides to deal with
an elevator.
Grain farmers sometimes agree to a forward contract with their
elevator. This marketing strategy resembles an insurance policy in
that it allows the farmer to guarantee an outlet for his crop at an
agreed-upon price.3 1 The farmer contracts in advance with the ele-
vator to deliver a certain quantity and quality of grain on a specified
date. The primary reason for using a forward contract is to assure
his market and price.3 2 In addition, the farmer reduces his risk be-
cause he never loses physical control of the grain until delivery to the
elevator.
Nevertheless, the increasing risk of insolvency may occur between
the time the parties contract and the time of delivery when the pay-
ment is due, leaving the farmer without an elevator and without the
benefit of the bargain. 33 In addition to these losses, the trustee in
bankruptcy has sixty days to decide if the farmer must fulfill the exec-
utory contract with the elevator. Thus, the possibility remains that
the grain farmer may receive payment even lower than the market
price, or no payment at all.34
In addition to these marketing options, a series of contracts de-
noted as voluntary extention of credit contracts are available. These
are agreements:
for the purchase of a specific amount of grain from a producer in
which the title to the grain passes to the grain buyer upon delivery,
but the price is to be determined or payment for the grain is to be
made at a date later than the date of delivery of the grain to the
grain buyer. Voluntary extension of credit contracts include de-
ferred or delayed payment contracts . . . and all other contractual
arrangements with the exception of cash sales and grain storage
28. See Looney & Byrd, Protecting the Farmer in Grain Marketing Transactions, 31
DRAKE L. REV. 519, 523 (1981-82).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Looney & Byrd, supra note 28, at 523-28.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
[Vol. 13
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agreements evidenced by a grain warehouse receipt.3 5
These credit contracts presume that title passes to the elevator upon
delivery and provide no bond coverage.
3 6
An example of this type of agreement is the deferred payment con-
tract. This option is often used to avoid payment of income tax.3
7
The grain price is determined upon delivery, but payment is de-
ferred into the future. This is an attractive marketing option because
it is similar to storage of grain, but without the additional storage
fee.38 Since the elevator holds the grain and defers payment, poten-
tial problems arise if the elevator goes bankrupt. The Minnesota leg-
islation presumes that title passes to the elevator upon delivery of
the grain.3 9 This presumption raises several issues when determin-
ing the grain farmer's rights as a creditor in bankruptcy.
Similar to the deferred-payment contract is the deferred-price con-
tract, more commonly known as the price-later contract. 40 This con-
tract was at the heart of the issue in Kern.4 1 In the price-later
35. MINN. STAT. § 223.16, subd. 16 (1984).
36. Id.
37. See Estes, Congress Rescues Farmer Deferred Crop Payment Contracts from IRS Attack,
3 AGRIC. L.J. 1 (1981); Geske, Deferral of Income from Crop Sales Under the New Installment
Sales Revision Act, 3 AGRIC. L.J. 13 (1981).
38. See Looney & Byrd, supra note 28, at 524.
39. See MINN. STAT. § 223.177, subd. 6. This subdivision states that the title to
grain delivered on a voluntary extension-of-credit contract transfers to the grain
buyer upon delivery. See also MINN. STAT. § 232.23, subd. 3. This subdivision states
that:
All grain delivered to a public grain warehouse operator shall be considered
sold at the time of delivery, unless arrangements have been made with the
public grain warehouse operator prior to or at the time of delivery to apply
the grain on contract, for shipment or consignment or for storage.
40. See Looney & Byrd, supra note 28, at 524.
41. See 369 N.W.2d at 568; see also Findings of Fact supra note 12, at 3-4.
Kern Grain presented a variety of documents to the farmers to record trans-
actions involving delivery of grain to it by the claimants. These documents
included:
(a) Truck Bills-of-Lading. Bills-of lading were issued for each load picked
up by truckers sent by Kern to haul grain off the claimant's (sic) farms for
delivery to other terminals. Some of the bills of lading were marked
"store," and some were unmarked. None were marked "Price Later" or
"Delayed Pricing";
(b) Certificates of Certified Weight. These are Minneapolis Grain Exchange
documents recording shipments received at ADM's Elevator D in St. Paul
(which received the plurality of grain "stored" at outside facilities by Kern in
the fall of 1981). Some were mailed to farmers, others were kept in the
farmer's files at Kern Grain. None of them were marked "Price Later" or
"Delayed Pricing";
(c) Grain Inspection Certificates. This form accompanied truck bills-of-lad-
ing or certificates of certified weight regarding individual shipments re-
ceived at ADM Elevator D. The certificates state that an inspection has been
made of "Grain Stored" or to be stored in Elevator D, and did not contain
the terms "Price Later" or "Delayed Pricing";
(d) Scale Memoranda. These documents were issued for each load deliv-
1987]
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contract, the farmer delivers the grain to the elevator with the price
to be determined in the future. Advantages to this agreement in-
clude avoiding on-farm storage and benefiting from higher market
prices.42
There are, however, many disadvantages to the deferred-payment
contract. First, the farmer must pay storage fees.43 Second, and by
far the most destructive aspect of this contract, are the misunder-
standings that continually occur because of the parties' failure to rec-
ognize the consequences of a price-later agreement. 44 These
problems arise because many farmers do not understand that they
lose title to their crop upon delivery to the elevator in this agree-
ment.45 Although the Minnesota legislation requires written docu-
mentation of every transaction,46 farmers often contract with their
elevator orally, as did the farmers in Kern. 47 Finally, the elevator is
relieved of any bond coverage for deferred-payment contracts
should the elevator fail.48
Open storage is another common marketing option available to
the parties. The farmer's objective when exercising this option is to
take advantage of seasonal price increases that will more than offset
storage costs. 4 9 Unlike the voluntary extension-of-credit contracts,
title does remain with the farmer if the farmer possesses a valid ware-
house receipt from the elevator evidencing ownership of the crop. 50
ered to Kern's Rice County facility. Some were marked "Store." On others
"P.L." was indicated. Still others were marked "Contract" or "Price Later"
and many of them were not marked at all. None of the memoranda ex-
plained the meanings of the terms "Price Later" or "Delayed Pricing"; and
(e) Kern Grain Statement. Claimants were issued this document, which
purported to show how much grain they had on deposit with the Company.
Some of the statements were marked with "Store," others were marked
"Price Later," but none of them contained an explanation of the term "Price
Later." In most cases, the statement indicated accrued storage charges, cal-
culated at a per bushel per month basis since the delivery date of the grain.
These charges confirmed the storage prices quoted to the farmers before
they placed their grain with Kern.
Id. at 3-4.
42. See Looney & Byrd, supra note 28, at 524.
43. See id.
44. Findings of Fact, supra note 12, at 51.
45. See MINN. STAT. § 232.23, subd. 3.
46. Id. §§ 223.175, 232.23, subd. 2, 4, 8.
47. Findings of Fact, supra note 12, at 3.
48. See Findings of Fact, supra note 12, at 49-52. According to these findings, the
claimant-farmers did not understand the consequences of the different contractual
arrangements.
49. Looney & Byrd, supra note 24, at 525.
50. See MINN. STAT. § 232.23, subd. 4(b). That section provides:
A grain warehouse receipt must be in duplicate, contain the name and loca-
tion of the grain warehouse, and be delivered to the depositor or the deposi-
tor's agent. Grain warehouse receipts shall be consecutively numbered as
prescribed by the commissioner and state the date of deposit, except where
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In the open storage situation, as well as all other transactions, the
elevator operator is required to issue a non-negotiable scale ticket
evidencing the quality and quantity of grain, the date the grain was
delivered, and whether the grain is to be stored or sold.51 This doc-
ument is to be delivered to the grain farmer upon each delivery of
grain, regardless of the type of transaction between the parties.52
A warehouse receipt must also be issued to the grain farmer upon
delivery of grain for storage. 53 This negotiable document must state
the name and location of the warehouse and state that, pursuant to
statutory provisions, the grain is insured through the date of expira-
tion of the annual license of that particular warehouse.54 Storage
costs are to be paid by the grain farmer upon presentation of the
warehouse receipt to the elevator or at the end of the storage pe-
riod.55 At that time, the same quantity and quality of grain previ-
ously deposited shall be returned to the grain farmer. The statute
does provide for bond coverage for all stored grain, but only if the
grain farmer can produce a valid warehouse receipt identical to the
statutory direction.56 If no warehouse receipt is produced or there is
the slightest deviation in form from the statutory model, the grain
farmer loses any bond coverage should the elevator become insol-
vent. 57 In addition, the farmer might not be able to recover his or
her crop even if the elevator remains solvent.58
the deposit of a certain lot for storage is not completed in one day. In that
case, the grain warehouse receipt, when issued, shall be dated not later than
Saturday of the week of delivery.
Id.; see also Interview with Jon Murphy, Special Assistant Attorney General, (October
19, 1985) [hereinafter Murphy Interview].
51. MINN. STAT. § 232.23, subd. 2. That section provides:
A public or private grain warehouse operator, upon receiving grain, shall
issue a scale ticket for each load of grain received. Scale tickets shall contain
the name, location and the date of each transaction and be consecutively
numbered. A duplicate copy of each scale ticket shall remain in the posses-
sion of the public or private grain warehouse operator as a permanent rec-
ord. The original scale ticket shall be delivered to the depositor upon
receipt of each load of grain. Each scale ticket shall have printed across its
face "This is a memorandum, non-negotiable, possession of which does not
signify that settlement has or has not been consumated." The scale ticket
shall state specifically whether the grain is received on contract, for storage,
for shipment or consignment or sold. If the grain is received on contract or
sold, the price shall be indicated on the scale ticket. All scale tickets shall be
dated and signed by the public or private grain warehouse operator or the
operator's agent or manager.
Id.
52. Id.
53. See id.; MINN. STAT. § 232.23, subd. 4 (1984).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 232.23, subd. 4(b).
56. Murphy Interview, supra note 50; see Findings of Fact, supra note 12, at 50-51.
57. See MINN. STAT. § 232.23, subd. 5; see also Swanson Interview, supra note 2.
58. See MINN. STAT. § 232.23, subd. 5.
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One problem the Minnesota legislation failed to take into account
is the farmer's customary informality in these agreements. A hand-
shake is all that many grain farmers demand when delivering their
grain.59 They seem unaware of the hard truth that their livelihoods
could quickly and easily be destroyed if the warehouse should go
bankrupt. The farmer's naivet6, whether it be legitimate or not, was
the major issue surrounding the Kern case.
III. MINNESOTA GRAIN ELEVATOR LEGISLATION
Minnesota is one of twenty-nine states that have enacted individual
legislation requiring grain elevators to obtain bonds.60 Although
legislation varies considerably from state to state, the objective is the
same: to provide protection and security for grain farmers to guar-
antee that they receive payment for their harvested crop. 6'
Effective state grain legislation must have both preventive and re-
medial provisions.62 Preventive provisions include licensing, mini-
mum net worth requirements, and annual inspections. Remedial
provisions establish compensation for grain farmers who experience
losses when their elevator fails despite the preventive provisions.
Examples of remedial provisions are those requiring indemnity
funds and bonding.
In Minnesota, the vast majority of country elevators are regulated
by state rather than federal legislation.63 Most elevators are, there-
59. See Looney & Byrd, supra note 30, at 523-28; see also Findings of Fact, supra
note 12, at 3.
60. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL INSURANCE PROGRAM FOR GRAIN
WAREHOUSE DEPOsITORS-ISSUES AND INFORMATION (GAO/RCED-85-39 March 1,
1985)[hereinafter GAO REPORT]. Other states having grain elevator legislation in-
clude: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Illinois, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Car-
olina, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Id. at 6. See also Mur-
phy Interview, supra note 50.
61. GAO REPORT, supra note 60, at 3-6.
62. Note, supra note 15, at 311.
63. Swanson Interview, supra note 2. The relationship between state and federal
warehouse legislation exemplifies the importance of effective state legislation. In
1916, the United States Warehouse Act was enacted to provide a uniform federal
regulatory system governing warehouses that store agricultural products. The Act's
major objective is to facilitate proper financing of the stored commodities. The Act
does not require all of the elevators to be licensed according to its provisions, but
merely offers an alternative to state regulation. Thus, an elevator operator can
choose to be federally or state licensed.
Elevators licensed under the Warehouse Act must pass certain requirements in
order to be federally licensed. Mr. Swanson stated that these requirements include
the funding of an acceptable bond, maintaining a minimum net worth, and paying of
licensing and inspection fees. After being licensed, warehousemen are subject to
unannounced periodic investigations by agents of the Department of Agriculture. In
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fore, regulated by chapters 223 and 232 of the Minnesota Statutes. 64
Chapter 223, the Grain Buyers Act,65 gives the Commissioner of Ag-
riculture the authority to regulate grain buyers. Chapter 232, the
Grain Storage Act,66 authorizes the Commissioner to regulate the
storage of grain by public grain warehouses. It is the inadequacies
and the inequities in these chapters that strip the responsible grain
farmer of any protection and security. These Acts better protect the
financially troubled, mismanaged, or fraudulently run grain elevator.
The statutory purpose of these Acts is to give the Commissioner of
Agriculture the authority to regulate grain buyers and local public
warehouses. Since country grain elevators are considered public
grain warehouses that buy and store grain, both chapters apply in
bankruptcy. In addition to the statutory purpose, the legislation
should minimize the risk in transactions between the grain farmer
and the elevator. This would ensure smooth and profitable dealings.
The Grain Buyers Act and the Grain Storage Act require annual
licensing of the elevator with the Commissioner of Agriculture
before any grain may be purchased or stored.67 Both Acts require
distribution of the licensing fees into the grain buyers and storage
fund.68 This fund is used to offset the expenses of administering and
enforcing each chapter.69
Before either license is issued, however, the applicant must file a
bond with the Commissioner as security in the event of an elevator
default.70 The applicant that seeks licensing under both Acts must
purchase both a grain buyer's bond and a grain storage bond.
addition, these warehouses must distribute warehouse receipts describing detailed
information about storage contracts between the parties. The warehousemen may be
fined or imprisoned for failing to comply with the Act.
64. Id.
65. MINN. STAT. §§ 223.15-.19.
66. Id. §§ 232.20-.25.
67. See id. § 223.17, subd. 1. "An application for a grain buyer's license must be
filed with the commissioner and the license issued before any grain may be
purchased. The types of grain buyers' licenses are: (a) private grain warehouse oper-
ator's license; (b) public grain warehouse operator's license; and (c) independent
grain buyer's license." Id.; see also id. § 232.22, subd. 1. "An application for a public
grain warehouse operator's license must be filed with the commissioner and the li-
cense issued before the purchase or storage of grain may be commenced." Id.
68. Compare id. § 223.17, subd. 3, with id. § 232.22, subd. 3.
69. Id. §§ 223.17, subd. 3, 232.22, subd. 3.
70. See id. § 223.17, subd. 4. That section provides:
Before a grain buyer's license is issued, the applicant for the license must
file with the commissioner a bond in a penal sum prescribed by the commis-
sioner but no less than the following amounts (a) $10,000 for grain buyers
whose gross annual purchases are $100,000 or less; (b) $20,000 for grain
buyers whose gross annual purchases are more than $100,000 but not more
than $750,000; (c) $30,000 for grain buyers whose gross annual purchases
are more than $750,000 but not more that $1,500,000; (d) $40,000 for grain
buyers whose gross annual purchases are more than $1,500,000 but not
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Although the Commissioner determines the amount of each bond,
there are statutory guidelines that formalize the amounts of the bond
coverage.71 These guidelines range from bond minimums of
$10,000 to $50,000 per year on each bond, depending upon the
business volume of the elevator.72
The grain buyer's bond provides coverage for losses that occur
when a grain farmer demands payment on a cash sale but the eleva-
tor is unable to pay within the statutory period because of insufficient
funds.73 The grain farmer who is damaged by a breach of contract
on a cash sale must file a written claim with the Commissioner within
180 days of the breach.74 If the claim is valid, the Commissioner may
immediately suspend the elevator's license.75 If more than one
claimant exists and the bond coverage is insufficient to pay the entire
liability, the bond proceeds are apportioned among the bona fide
claimants.76
The grain storage bond provides coverage for losses that occur
when a grain farmer tenders a valid warehouse receipt and the eleva-
tor is unable to deliver that particular quantity or quality of grain or
provide payment for grain sold on a cash basis. The warehouse re-
ceipt signifies open storage of the grain in the elevator. The receipt
must be in statutory form and include the name and location of the
warehouse, the date of deposit, and other pertinent information evi-
dencing the grain farmer's ownership of the stored grain. 77 If the
more than $3,000,000 and (e) $50,000 for grain buyers whose gross annual
purchases exceed $3,000,000....
Id.; see also id. § 232.22, subd. 4 (grain storage bond requirements).
71. Id. §§ 223.17, subd. 4, 232.22 subd. 4.
72. Id. §§ 223.17, subd. 4, 232.22 subd. 4.
73. Id. § 223.17, subd. 8(a). "The bond required ... shall provide payment of
loss caused by the grain buyer's failure to pay, upon the owner's demand, the
purchase price of grain sold to the grain buyer in the manner provided by subdivision
5, including loss caused by failure to pay within the time required ...." Id.
74. Id. § 223.17, subd. 7. "A producer claiming to be damaged by a breach of a
contract for the purchase of grain by a licensed grain buyer may file a written claim
with the commissioner. The claim must state the facts constituting the claim." Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. § 223.17, subd. 8(c).
77. Id. § 232.23, subd. 4(b). That subdivision provides:
A grain warehouse receipt shall contain either on its face or reverse side the
following specific grain warehouse and storage contract: "This grain is re-
ceived, insured and stored through the date of expiration of the annual
licenses of this grain warehouse and terms expressed in the body of the
grain warehouse receipt shall constitute due notice to its holder of the expi-
ration of the storage period. It is unlawful for a public grain warehouse
operator to charge or collect a greater or lesser amount than the amount
filed with the commissioner. All charges shall be collected by the grain
warehouse operator upon the owner's presentation of the grain warehouse
receipt for the sale or delivery of the grain represented by the receipt, or the
termination of the storage period. Upon the presentation of this grain ware-
house receipt and payment of all charges accrued up to the time of presenta-
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claimant has properly filed his written claim within the 180 day pe-
riod and the Commissioner finds the claim is valid, the bonding com-
pany issues payment. As with the grain buyer's bond, if the bond
coverage is insufficient to pay all of the valid claims, the proceeds are
apportioned on a pro rata basis among claimants.78 In addition to
the bond coverage, if an elevator defaults, then any grain owned or
stored in that warehouse is sold and the combined proceeds depos-
ited in a special fund.79 These proceeds, in conjunction with the
bond coverage, are then distributed to valid holders of warehouse
receipts.SO
To determine the bond amount for each elevator, the commis-
sioner requires that financial records be maintained and periodically
delivered to the Department of Agriculture. The Grain Buyers Act
requires the annual delivery of balance sheets, a statement of in-
come, a statement of the dollar amount of grain purchased in previ-
ous fiscal years, and other records prepared by the warehouse,
coincidental with a balance sheet compiled by an independent ac-
counting firm.81
The Grain Storage Act requires the elevator to file monthly re-
ports evidencing the net liability of all grain outstanding in ware-
house receipts.82 These reports are also used to determine the
amount of the bond.83 In addition, this Act lists a number of book-
keeping procedures used to determine the amount of grain on
hand.84 This amount is important when determining whether the
grain farmer can recover his crop at any given point in time. This
Act specifically states that the elevator "must maintain... at all times
grain of proper grade and sufficient quantity to meet delivery obliga-
tions of all outstanding grain warehouse receipts."85 In addition to
receiving these financial records, the Commissioner reserves the
right to make inspections and audits of each warehouse at the
agency's discretion.86 The purpose of these two forms of investiga-
tion is to ensure the responsible management of the elevator.
A final explanation of the legislation again involves the bonds of
tion, the above amount, kind and grade of grain will be delivered within the
time prescribed by law to the depositor or the depositor's order."
Id.
78. Id. § 223.22, subd. 7(e).
79. Id. § 232.22, subd. 7(d).
80. Id. This could result in even further losses because grain may be sold in the
fall, when the price of grain is at its lowest.
81. Id. § 223.17, subd. 6.
82. Id. § 232.22, subd. 5.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. § 232.22, subd. 5(d).
86. Id. § 232.24.
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each Act and when they do not apply. The Grain Buyers Act pro-
vides that no bond coverage exists for voluntary extension-of-credit
contracts.8 7 These types of transactions include any agreement be-
tween a grain farmer and an elevator except the cash sale and open
storage.8 8 Bond coverage exists, therefore, only for these two trans-
actions, and does not exist in any situation involving credit such as
deferred-payment, price-later, or any hybrid contract. In addition, if
the farmer was not given a statutorily valid warehouse receipt, there
is no bond coverage.
Associated with the preceeding provision of no bond coverage for
voluntary extension-of-credit contracts is the statutory presumption
that the title to the grain passes upon delivery to the elevator.89 This
presumption applies in a voluntary extension-of-credit and could oc-
cur in an open storage situation if the farmer does not tender a valid
warehouse receipt.
An elevator that fails to comply with either Act is guilty of a misde-
meanor.90 The Department of Agriculture may suspend or revoke
the license, depending upon the agency's findings.91
IV. IN RE KERN
In the late 1970's, the Kern elevator, located in Kenyon, Minne-
sota began advertising that it had access to additional storage
space.9 2 The solicitation came at a time when most other grain facili-
ties were full. The Kern elevator, licensed under both state Acts was
similar to many other warehouses in Minnesota. The facility would
store and buy grain from farmers to be sold when prices rose.
In the spring of 1982, some depositors at the elevator demanded
their grain or the proceeds from the grain sale. 9 3 Kern was unable to
satisfy these requests and subsequently filed for bankruptcy on July
14, 1982. Prior to the elevator's bankruptcy filing, the Commis-
sioner received forty-one claims from the depositors. Claims contin-
ued to be submitted through November 29, 1982, seven months
after the first claim was filed.94
The Commissioner investigated the situation and determined that
Kern did not have the additional 800,000 bushel storage capacity
87. Id. § 223.16, subd. 16.
88. Id.
89. Id. § 223.177, subd. 6. The statute states that the title to grain delivered on a
voluntary extension-of-credit contract transfers to the grain buyer upon delivery.
90. Id. §§ 223.18, 232.25.
91. Id. § 223.18.
92. Findings of Fact, supra note 12, at 3.
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id.
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that they had advertised. 9 5 Rather, the elevator had only a 200,000
bushel capacity. The remaining grain that Kern solicited was trans-
ported to commercial elevators in the Twin Cities.96 Kern warranted
to these larger facilities that the country elevator held title to the
grain.9 7 Kern, however, continued to charge storage costs for the
depositor's grain to which neither party held title. The administra-
tive law judge found that no depositor had knowledge of the sale and
that the questionable sale violated the Grain Storage Act.98
The first of three issues decided by the court of appeals concerned
the nature of the agreement between the parties.99 The bonding
company, arguing for Kern, stated that the agreement between the
parties was for a price-later contract, thus transferring title and ne-
gating any bond coverage for the forty-one claimants.100
The claimants argued that it was their intention to store the grain
with Kern pursuant to the Grain Storage Act, thus retaining title and
affording them bond coverage.' 0 t The bonding company answered
this argument by pointing out that not one depositor had a ware-
house receipt to evidence an open storage contract.1 0 2 Therefore,
Kern had the right to do whatever it desired with the grain that be-
longed to it.
The court of appeals held that the "factual findings of an agency
are entitled to a presumption of correctness."10 3 In this case, the
court did "not even find the existence of conflicting evidence."104
The Commissioner's findings supported the claimants' position that
they did intend open storage instead of any voluntary extension-of-
credit contract.' 0 5 The opinion did not address the statutory pre-
sumption of title passing upon delivery if no warehouse receipt is
tendered.106 The court may have ignored this statutory provision
because the elevator did not always distribute warehouse receipts in
95. See id. at 3.
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 5. MINN. STAT. § 232.23, subd. 13 states: "No warehouse operator
may sell or dispose of or deliver out of storage any grain stored without the express
authority of the depositor and the return of the grain warehouse receipt." Id.
99. Kern, 369 N.W.2d at 569.
100. Id. at 570-71.
101. Id. at 571.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Findings of Fact, supra note 12, at 7. The intent of the claimant, Earl
Peter, was for Kern to store his grain. Peter's son, however, received a delayed pric-
ing contract. The senior Peter did not know what a delayed pricing contract was and
asked for an explanation from Phyliss Kern. Ms. Kern stated that a delayed pricing
contract was the same as open storage.
106. Kern, 369 N.W.2d at 569-70.
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these open storage agreements, as required by the legislation.10 7
Thus, the claimants could not possibly prove that they intended to
hold title to the grain, except by oral evidence.
The second issue addressed by the court was whether the forty-
one depositors properly filed their claims within the six month statu-
tory period.108 The first claim was filed on April 26, 1982, but the
majority of the claims were filed seven months later on November
26, 1982.109 According to the statutory language, "[a]ny person
claiming to be damaged by a breach of the conditions of a bond...
may enter complaint thereof... to the department [of public service]
within six months from the breach of the conditions of the bond."l 10
Thus, the critical issue is: when was the contract breached? The
bonding company argued that the six month period began running
when the first claim was filed on April 26.111 This argument would
disallow bond coverage for most of the claimants since they did not
file until seven months later.'1 2
The claimants, on the other hand, interpreted this ambiguous sec-
tion of the statute as allowing each depositor "6 months from the
time the conditions of the bond were breached as to that claimant to
file his claim."' 1 3 This would give each depositor six months from
the time each learned of the breach to file a claim with the
Commissioner.
The court held that the six month period commences upon the
filing of bankruptcy by the elevator which occurred on July 14,
1982.114 This event should leave no question as to whether a breach
has occurred between the warehouse and the depositors. The result
of this decision allowed every claimant coverage under the bonds. l15
The third and final issue discussed by the court involved the bond
years upon which recovery could be based."l 6 The court based its
opinion on the premise of the Commission that "the wrong [the con-
version] which led to the breach took place whenever the grain was
delivered to [Kern]. Grain belonging to the claimants was delivered
107. Id. at 571; see also Findings of Fact, supra note 12, at 8. Kern trucks removed
five loads of soybeans from storage bins on the farm of Wayne Trahms with the ac-
quiesence of Trahm's father who lived on the farm. Kern neither obtained the per-
mission of Trahms, nor furnished a receipt. See id.
108. 369 N.W.2d at 569-70.
109. Id. at 568.
110. MINN. STAT. § 232.13 (1980). As the Kern court noted, the notice period is
now 180 days rather than 6 months. Kern, 369 N.W.2d at 570.
111. Kern, 369 N.W.2d at 570.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 571.
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to Kern as early as 1979-80."117 Since the purpose of bonds under
the then applicable statute was to protect against malfeasance by the
warehouse,1 18 the court held that "[w]hen such malfeasance occur[s]
during the time period covered by the bond, recovery may be had
against the bond."t19
The bonding company argued that this language disallowing the
stacking, or recovery against several years of bonds, is unambigu-
ous. 1 20 Recovery should, therefore, only be allowed on the 1981-82
bond, because Kern's failure took place during "the coverage dates
of that bond."121
The court again agreed with the Commissioner's finding and ig-
nored the statute in finding for the claimants. The administrative law
judge found that recovery should be on the 1979-80, 1980-81, and
1981-82 bonds.122 This stacking of the bonds was allowed because
Kern was converting the grain unbeknownst to the depositors during
this three year period. '2 "While the breach of the conditions of the
bond did not actually occur until spring or summer of 1982 when
Kern could not give [the] claimants their money, the wrong [the con-
version] which led to the breach took place whenever the grain was
delivered to them."124 The court agreed with the Commissioner's
finding that the bonds are required by statute to protect against mal-
feasance by the elevator. When such malfeasance occurs during the
period of bond coverage, as in this situation, recovery is allowed
under all applicable bonds. 125 This ruling ignores the statutory pro-
visions prohibiting stacking, to obtain what appears to be a guaran-
tee of an equitable recovery of at least part of the losses incurred by
the forty-one claimants.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATION
Theoretically, the marketing option between the grain farmer and
the warehouse should be relatively risk-free. This is the general in-
tent of the legislation. 126 As Kern illustrated, however, only by ignor-
ing the existing legislation could the court provide some level of
recovery for the claimants. This avoidance of the Acts in conjunction
with the increasing number of grain elevator bankruptcies and the
117. Id.
118. MINN. STAT. § 232.13 (1980).
119. Kern, 369 N.W.2d at 571.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Findings of Fact, supra note 12, at 66 and Appendix A.
123. Kern, 369 N.W.2d at 571.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Murphy Interview, supra note 50; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 60, at 1-
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subsequent losses to the grain farmers caused by a troubled agricul-
tural economy illustrates the pressing need for a major overhaul to
chapters 223 and 232.
A major problem with the Grain Buyers and Grain Storage Acts
involves the statutory presumption that title to the grain passes to
the elevator upon delivery.127 Both Acts allow an exception to this
presumption if the agreement between the parties is for open stor-
age.128 This exception is in agreement with Minnesota's common
law, that views an open storage agreement as a bailment situation
where title remains with the farmer.129 To assure that the arrange-
ment is intepreted as open storage, however, the farmer must pro-
duce a warehouse receipt which conforms to statutory requirements.
The problem appears when the farmer attempts to reclaim his
stored crop from his elevator, but has no warehouse receipt, as was
the case in Kern, or has an invalid warehouse receipt. Pursuant to the
statutory presumption, the elevator operator now has title to the
grain, and has actually held title since delivery, because the agree-
ment between the parties is not considered a voluntary extension-of-
credit agreement.' 3 0 Therefore, if the farmer has a warehouse re-
ceipt that differs in any way from the provisions in the statute or has
no warehouse receipt at all, title passes to the elevator, and the bur-
den falls upon the farmer to prove his intention for open storage.'S
Since the legislation presumes that a voluntary extension-of-credit
situation was intended if there is no valid warehouse receipt, the
farmer can seek no relief from the bonding because these credit
agreements are exempt from coverage.' 3 2 The distraught farmer
may believe that a court action can provide relief. The statute, how-
ever, again fails to protect the persons it was designed to protect.
The legislation allows only a valid, statutorily conforming warehouse
receipt to be admissible into evidence and further dictates that "no
slip or other memorandum or other form of receipt is admissible as
evidence in any civil action."13 Thus, the farmer who intended an
127. MINN. STAT. §§ 223.17, subd. 7, 232.22, subd. 6.
128. Id.
129. Hall v. Pillsbury, 43 Minn. 33, 44 N.W. 673 (Minn. 1890). A deposit of grain
for storage is a bailment. The title remains with the depositor. He is deemed to be
the owner of grain in the warehouse to the amount of his deposit. Although the
identical grain he deposited has been removed, other grain of like kind and quality is
substituted in its stead. The holders of receipts for grain of the same kind and quality
so deposited are tenants in common in the mass of grain of that kind and quality in
the warehouse. The interest of each is limited to the amount called for by his receipt.
Id.
130. MINN. STAT. § 223.16, subd. 16.
131. Id. § 232.23, subd. 5.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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open storage agreement, but was not given a valid warehouse re-
ceipt, has no recourse. Fortunately for the claimants in Kern, the
court circumvented the legislation by allowing oral testimony as to
the existence of open storage contracts.' 34
The existing legislation should be modified to allow the use of any
reasonable evidence to aid the grain farmer in reacquiring his grain.
The model Illinois legislation eases this problem by allowing any
"evidence of ownership" to be admitted to establish a claim. 135 This
expansion of the allowable documentation would better protect the
grain farmer, as is intended by both Acts.
The Acts do require careful documentation of all financial records
to determine the amount of grain in storage and to assure compli-
ance by the warehouse with the Commissioner's regulation set forth
in the statutes.' 3 6 This requirement creates an increased need for
stepped-up inspection of each country elevator. This would guaran-
tee the financial responsibility of the warehouse and avoid conver-
sion of grain similar to that in Kern.
The 180 day limitation period for filing a claim with the Commis-
sioner is inadequate and presents a third problem in both Acts.'
3 7
First, as Kern illustrated, both Acts make no mention of when the
limitation period should commence. The second inadequacy is that
180 days is a relatively short span of time to a grain farmer. Many
grain farmers leave their deposits with the elevator for years before
deciding to sell. In these situations, the grain farmer has no reason
to suspect that an elevator is experiencing financial problems or even
converting his crop. A compromising time limit of perhaps twelve to
eighteen months would afford better protection for the grain farmer.
A fourth problem with the legislation involves the grain buyers
bond and the corresponding grain storage bond. 138 There are nu-
merous subproblems within this troubled area. The first bond prob-
lem concerns the inadequate bonding coverage in both Acts. The
statutes provide guidelines for the Commissioner that range from
$10,000 to $50,000 per year dependent upon the volume of business
134. Kern, 369 N.W.2d at 565.
135. See GAO REPORT, supra note 60, at 13-19. Basically, depositors, sellers, and
lenders with "evidence of ownership" are covered by the fund. Id at 13. To finance
this fund, warehouses pay $7.50 for each $1,000 of bond formerly required by the
state, up to $10,000 of bond coverage. The rate drops to $5 per $1,000 for the next
$15,000 of bond and $3 per $1,000 for bond amounts over $25,000. Dealers pay $10
for each $1,000 of bond formerly required. Id. at 17.
As for actual coverage, 100% of valid claims is covered for grain stored under
warehouse receipts. For other grain delivered to the dealer, 85% of a claim, with a
maximum payment of $100,000 per claim is allowed. Id. at 19.
136. MINN. STAT. §§ 223.17, subd. 8, 232.24.
137. Id. §§ 223.17, subd. 7, 232.22, subd. 6.
138. Id. §§ 223.17, subd. 4, 232.22, subd. 4.
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conducted by the elevator. 139 This maximum limit is the lowest com-
pared to the twenty-eight other states that regulate their grain eleva-
tors. Ten of these states have no upper limit, while the remaining
states have an average maximum limit of $535,000.140
The coverage on 1981-82 bonds in Kern totalled $200,000.14' To-
tal claims by the depositors, however, were nearly $600,000.142 If
the court would have followed the provisions disallowing stacking of
bonds in the legislation, the claimants' potential recovery would have
been significantly less. By granting stacking of the bonds over the
four year period, the court created an equitable solution that allowed
the depositors to receive almost thirty-three cents on the dollar for
their crops. 143 This wide disparity illustrates the inadequacy of the
bonding amounts.
A fifth problem with the bonding arises when an elevator fails and
there is insufficient grain on hand to satisfy the depositors. Section
232.22, subdivision 7(d) of the Grain Storage Act states that when a
bankruptcy occurs, all of the remaining grain in the warehouse is
sold and the proceeds are put into a special fund for the depositor in
addition to the bond disbursement for holders of valid warehouse
receipts.144 This fund, in conjunction with the bond coverage, is dis-
bursed to claimants holding valid warehouse receipts.145 As was il-
lustrated in Kern, the amount was still insufficient to cover all
claims. 146
139. Murphy Interview, supra note 50.
140. See GAO REPORT, supra note 60, at 9-10. Minnesota has the dubious distinc-
tion of being tied with Florida for the lowest maximum bond limit. Neighboring
grain producing states have the following maximum limits: Missouri, $1,000,000;
Michigan, $400,000. North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Iowa have no
maximum bond limit.
141. Findings of Fact, supra note 12, at 8; see also MINN. STAT. § 232.22, subd. 4.
This section of the Grain Storage Act states that before a licence is issued the appli-
cant for a public grain warehouse operator's license shall file with the Commissioner
a bond in a penal sum prescribed by the Commissioner. The penal sum on a condi-
tion one bond shall be established by rule by the Commissioner pursuant to the re-
quirements of chapter 14 of Minnesota Statutes for all grain outstanding on grain
warehouse receipts. The penal sum on a condition two bond shall not be less than
$10,000 for each location up to a maximum of five locations.
Pursuant to administrative rule, the elevator need only have 50% of the grain
stored covered by the storage bond. Under the federal act the bonding must be to
the entire storage capacity. The elevator has the choice of either selecting the state
requirements or the more demanding federal requirements. Most elevators in Min-
nesota naturally choose the state requirements. Murphy Interview, supra note 50.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. MINN. STAT. § 232.22, subd. 7(d).
145. Id.
146. Recovery from the 1979-80 and 1980-81 bonds in addition to the 1981-82
bonds increased the recovery per claimant by sixty-six percent. However, the forty-
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One problem with grain pooling is that the statute makes no provi-
sion for the proceeds and its distribution.14 7 Even if this question is
answered, the statute's non-differentiation of the various commodity
prices between, for example, corn and soybeans creates further
problems. Due to this non-differentiation, a soybean farmer may re-
ceive a lower disbursement amount when this commodity's price is
significantly higher than other grains. 148
Distribution of the proceeds is the sixth problem existing under
the present Grain Storage Act. The Grain Storage Act specifically
states that disbursement will be made to holders of warehouse re-
ceipts.' 49 If there are no warehouse receipt holders, as was the case
in Kern, who is entitled to the proceeds? Here is yet another unan-
swered question that the legislation ignores.
Finally, a problem arises concerning bond coverage. The Acts al-
low coverage only for cash sales under the Grain Buyers Act and for
open storage under the Grain Storage Act. 150 Coverage is excluded
for any voluntary extension-of-credit contract.' 5 ' Of the twenty-nine
states with grain elevator legislation, only three (including Minne-
sota) have this exclusion.15 2
There are no clear policy reasons for the coverage exclusion in
credit situations. What is clear, however, is that elevators have an
unfair advantage when dealing with a depositor who does not know
the consequences of failing to secure a valid warehouse receipt in an
open storage setting. Kern illustrated the fact that farmers and grain
elevator operators alike conduct much of their business orally, and
seal their contracts with a handshake. The legislation does not take
into account these informal business practices and, therefore, the
grain farmer is severely disadvantaged. 53
Coverage for every transaction between the parties would create
an easy solution to the problem of bond coverage. This would better
protect the farmer as intended by the statutes, and would not impair
one claimants have yet to see any of their losses recouped. Murphy Interview, supra
note 50. Mr. Murphy stated that the Kern elevator's insurance company has yet to
distribute any bond coverage to any of the claimants. Id.
147. MINN. STAT. § 232.22, subd. 7(d).
148. Interview with Dale Dahl, Professor of Agricultural Economics at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minn. (November 14, 1985) [hereinafter Dahl Interview].
149. MINN. STAT. § 232.22, subd. 7(d).
150. Id. § 223.17, subd. 5.
151. Id. § 232.22, subd. 7(b).
152. See Looney & Byrd, supra note 28, at 523-28; see also GAO REPORT, supra note
60, at 6-7. Michigan and North Dakota are the only other states that prohibit bond
coverage on credit transactions in which the farmer transfers title of the grain to the
operator, but agrees to defer payment.
153. GAO REPORT, supra note 60, at 6-7. This study analogized the grain farmer's
problems involving country elevators with those of a weary traveler on a return flight
home, finding his parked car has been sold to another.
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the elevator's operation since it must obtain bonding anyway. The
bonding companies may balk as such a suggestion, fearing that it is
too risky. Such fears of the surety may be eased by analyzing the
steps taken by other states to curtail the problems with warehouse
legislation.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
As mentioned previously, the Illinois grain warehouse legislation
is currently the model regarding problems inherent in bank-
ruptcy.' 54 The statutory modifications of Minnesota's legislation al-
ready discussed should be analyzed with this model in mind.
The Illinois legislaton enacted a new priority scheme in 1982 that
allows recovery from an indemnity fund by anyone with evidence of
either a storage or sale contract with their warehouse.155 The fund is
financed by an operator's fee equivalent to the amount formerly paid
for a surety bond.156
Specifically, claimants of first priority are those with a warehouse
receipt or written evidence showing a storage contract. Second in
priority include those who have written evidence documenting a sale
and have completed the delivery and pricing within thirty days prior
to the elevator failure. Any remaining grain or proceeds are distrib-
uted to others with contracts for sale that have not been paid.15 7
Generally, this model legislation eases the requirements needed to
recover from the fund and expands the number of claimants who can
obtain coverage. The indemnity fund has a maximum limit of
$3,000,000 with provision to borrow if the need should arise.158
Since its inception in Illinois, the legislation has been accepted by all
concerned parties and has worked well.t59
In addition to the Illinois indemnity fund, requiring the grain
farmers to insure their own grain sales is another potential remedy to
this problem. The dealings between producers and warehouses cre-
ate the kind of risk found in any insurable business venture. Cur-
rently, there is one private insurance company that offers such
protection.160 The policy covers grain produced in Minnesota and
grain in the Payment-in-Kind (PIK) Program which is stored at li-
154. ILLINOIS GRAIN INSURANCE ACT, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 114, § 701-102 (1983).
The Grain Insurance Act provides a system to compensate grain producers who have
incurred a financial loss due to a failure of a grain dealer or warehouseman.
155. Id.
156. Id. See Comment, Grain Elevator Bankuptcy-Has Illinois Successfully Provided Se-
curity to Farmers, 1983 S. ILL. U. L.J. 337, 339-40 (1983).
157. See Comment, supra note 156, at 342, 348-55.
158. Id.
159. Id. See GAO REPORT, supra note 60, at 13-19.
160. See GAO REPORT, supra note 60, at 23-24.
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censed warehouses or sold to licensed grain dealers on price-later or
deferred-payment contracts.161 The warehouse or dealer must be in
Minnesota or within seventy-five miles of the state's border. Cover-
age can be purchased in increments of $50,000, up to a total of
$200,000.162 The policy covers eighty percent of losses on grain
stored under warehouse receipts. Open storage contracts with inva-
lid warehouse receipts and grain sold under either price-later or de-
ferred-payment contracts are covered for eighty percent of losses
occurring within ninety days after delivery. Coverage decreases by
one percent for each week beyond ninety days after delivery, with
minimum coverage being sixty percent of the loss.163 As of January
1986, the premium was $35 for the first $50,000 of coverage plus
$15 for each additional increment of $50,000.164
This would seem to be an easy solution to the grain farmer's di-
lemma. Sales of this policy have, however, been below expectations.
It seems that farmers do not think they need such insurance because
they have confidence in their local elevators. 165 This confidence may
not last long if losses from elevator failures continue. The surety in
Kern, for example, has yet to reimburse any of the forty-one claim-
ants for their losses. 166
The United States House of Representatives' Committee of Agri-
culture is currently studying the feasibility of a federal deposit insur-
ance program for grain warehouses similar to those programs
available to banks through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC).167 The FDIC insures each bank depositor up to
$100,000. This system was established in 1933 during a period of
bank failures not unlike the current problems involving grain
elevators.
There seems, however, to be limited support for a grain deposit
insurance program. Issues of concern for such a program include its
potentially high cost, the expansion of current regulatory and exami-
nation activities, methods of finance, and the possibility that such a
program may encourage unsound warehouse management.168 Rec-
ommendations have yet to be made by the legislative committee re-
garding the possibility of establishing such a program.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Murphy Interview, supra note 50.
167. GAO REPORT, supra note 60, at 1-22.
168. Id. at 7.
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CONCLUSION
The desperate financial situation of the farmer across the nation
demands immediate attention by the federal and state governments.
Minnesota's grain farmers are not excluded from this increasing
problem. Every year, thousands of this state's grain farmers unwit-
tingly engage in risky marketing transactions. These transactions
have taken millions of dollars from the grain farmer. The Grain Buy-
ers and Grain Storage Acts provide little, if any, protection for grain
farmers. Instead, they give the warehouse a protective shield in
bankruptcy proceedings.
One potential remedy lies with the model Illinois warehouse legis-
lation, which has created a new priority scheme in bankruptcy set-
tings. Another potential solution is the purchase of private
insurance to guarantee a quick recovery of any losses due to ware-
house insolvency. It is unlikely, however, that the federal govern-
ment will establish a federal warehouse insurance system similar to
the FDIC to compensate insolvency victims. Thus, the most obvious
remedy is for the Minnesota Legislature to amend the present Acts,
keeping in mind the practical aspects of grain farming and the eco-
nomics of the various grain marketing transactions. Modification of
this legislation would remedy a needless burden placed upon today's
already over-burdened grain farmer.
Todd Gillingham
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